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How	do	you	manage	a	risk	like	COVID-19?	Lessons
from	Camus,	Beck	and	Dörner
When	governments	are	dealing	with	an	unprecedented	crisis,	they	tend	to	stick	to	the	playbook	for	fear	of	criticism
later.	Sergio	Scandizzo	(European	Investment	Bank)	and	Chitro	Majumdar	(RsRL)	discuss	what	light	Albert
Camus,	sociologist	Hans	Beck	and	psychologist	Dietrich	Dörner	can	shed	on	their	handling	of	the	pandemic.
Orders!	…	When	what’s	needed	is	imagination.
(Albert	Camus,	La	Peste)
The	scale	and	global	synchronicity	of	COVID-19’s	impact	has	been	unprecedented.	Yet	the	political	statements	and
actions	we	see	in	response	to	it	are	neither	unique	nor	new,	but	recur	quite	systematically	in	the	wake	of	disastrous
events.
One	of	these	is	the	behaviour	of	government	officials	–	judged	by	many	as	either	irresolute	and	slow	to	react	in	the
early	stages	of	the	contagion,	or	unnecessarily	draconian	once	the	pandemic	character	of	the	problem	was	clear.
With	some	notable	exceptions	(for	example	Singapore,	whose	government	has	acted	forcefully	and	consistently
since	the	beginning),	we	can	see	the	same	pattern	at	play	in	both	democratic	and	non-democratic	countries.
Hospital	staff	disinfecting	patients	in	a	wooden	tub	during	the	outbreak	of	bubonic	plague	in
Karachi,	India.	Photograph,	1897.	probably	by	R	Jalbhoy.	Photo:	Wellcome	Collection	via
CC-BY	4.0	licence
While	European	democracies	were	worried	about	their	citizens’	reaction,	in	non-democratic	countries	the	initial
concern	of	government	officials	seems	to	have	been	to	protect	themselves	from	external	scrutiny	and	judgment.	For
instance,	the	Chinese	government	was	initially	reluctant	to	enact	widespread	containment	measures	because	it	was
chiefly	concerned	with	its	international	reputation,	perhaps	because	they	do	not	have	to	worry	about	internal
criticism	that	much.	Only	once	they	have	done	so	do	they	take	action	openly	–	possibly	because	they	recognise
there	is	no	point	in	covering	up	or,	better,	because	the	reputational	cost	of	covering	up	is	higher	than	that	of
transparency.
At	that	point,	they	can	be	more	effective	than	their	democratic	counterparts,	because	they	are	less	concerned	about
internal	consensus.	Democratically	elected	governments,	on	the	other	hand,	are	worried	about	auditability	in	the
first	place	–	that	is	why	they	are	less	efficient,	especially	at	the	beginning	–	although	they	may	have	more
opportunity	to	build	a	common	response	later	on,	as	the	population	buys	into	the	idea	of	behavioural	changes.
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In	both	cases,	what	we	see	at	play	is	a	concern	on	the	part	of	government	officials	to	ensure	that	their	behaviour	is
fully	justifiable	and	auditable	ex	post	so	that	any	adverse	outcome	cannot	be	blamed	on	them:	a	prevalence	of
accountability	over	responsibility.	The	incentives	in	large	systems	are	stacked	in	favour	of	going	by	what	is
perceived	to	be	right	–	to	err,	even	knowingly,	on	the	wrong	side	–	rather	than	risk	addressing	real	issues,	and
pursuing	plausible	and	appropriate	action	using	common	sense	and	imagination.	In	both	cases,	the	response	is
initially	blunted	by	rulers’	concern	for	their	own	interest	(survival	in	power),	while	the	subsequent	switch	to	a	more
drastic	set	of	measures	is	used	—	by	democratic	and	non-democratic	governments	alike	—	to	strengthen	their	grip
on	power.
How	did	we	get	to	this	point?	How	did	following	the	rulebook	and	due	process	became	a	hallmark	of	political
leadership?	How	did	a	society	with	a	level	of	technology	so	advanced	as	to	be	able	to	literally	destroy	the	planet,
and	with	a	degree	of	self-reflection	so	sophisticated	as	to	continually	subject	to	scrutiny	every	facet	of	its	behaviour,
come	to	regard	the	management	of	risk	as	an	exercise	in	audit?
Perhaps	the	answer,	as	suggested	by	sociologist	Hans	Beck	in	his	seminal	book	Risk	Society,	is	that	the	social,
economic	and	political	side	effects	of	risks	in	modern	societies	(what	he	calls	modernisation	risks)	are	as	important
–	if	not	more	important	–	than	the	risks	themselves.	The	management	of	risk	is	taken	away	from	business	and
science,	and	becomes	a	central	political	issue	displacing	more	traditional	priorities	and	driving	an	expansion	of	state
authority	and	scope	of	intervention.	Policymakers	are	aware	that	the	perception	that	they	failed	in	their	risk
management	role	is	worse	than	the	danger	itself.	At	the	same	time,	the	desire	for	more	control	over	risks	creates
opportunities	for	system	changes	–	towards	more	centralisation,	bureaucracy	and	ultimately	power	–	which	are
difficult	even	for	the	best-intentioned	politician	to	resist.
So	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that,	when	caught	unawares,	those	same	politicians	claim	they	are	facing	an
“unprecedented”	or	“once	in	a	lifetime”	event:	the	infamous	black	swan.
As	black	swans	go,	it	is	difficult	to	find	better	examples	than	epidemics:	they	have	low	probability;	they	are
potentially	catastrophic;	and	they	take	us	by	surprise.	In	his	novel	The	Plague,	which	should	be	required	reading	for
anyone	with	public	office	responsibility,	Albert	Camus	articulates	(half	a	century	before	Nassim	Taleb	reintroduced
the	idea	to	the	world	of	finance)	our	unhealthy	relationship	with	rare	adverse	events:
“Everybody	knows	that	pestilences	have	a	way	of	recurring	in	the	world,	yet	somehow	we	find	it	hard	to
believe	in	ones	that	crash	down	on	our	heads	from	a	blue	sky.	There	have	been	as	many	plagues	as
wars	in	history,	yet	always	plagues	and	wars	take	people	equally	by	surprise.”	(Albert	Camus,	La	Peste,
1947).
However,	dealing	with	uncertainty	might	call	for	different	approaches	depending	on	one’s	objective.	Statistics
provides	the	basic	paradigm	of	hypothesis	testing,	whereby	an	inference	from	empirical	evidence	may	be	wrong	in
two	ways:	Type	I	and	Type	II	errors.	The	former	happens	when	we	accept	a	wrong	thesis	as	valid,	while	the	latter
takes	place	when	we	reject	a	correct	one.	In	a	judicial	context,	a	Type	I	error	occurs	when	an	innocent	is	convicted,
while	a	Type	II	error	occurs	when	a	guilty	person	is	acquitted.	In	science,	we	may	recall	Karl	Popper’s	falsification
criterion:	a	theory	that	cannot	be	possibly	proven	wrong	is	not	a	theory	–	it	is	a	fantasy.	If	I	postulate	the	existence
of	unicorns,	I	am	not	making	a	scientific	claim.	That	is	not	because	nobody	has	ever	seen	a	unicorn,	but	precisely
because	it	is	impossible	to	design	an	experiment	that	would	conclusively	exclude	the	possibility	that	such	mythical
animal	exists.	Scientists,	therefore,	tend	to	minimise	Type	I	errors.
By	contrast,	risk	managers	should	favour	being	wrong	about	their	theories	and,	hence,	aim	at	minimising	Type	II
errors.	This	is	not	only	because	they	cannot	afford	to	wait	for	enough	evidence	to	be	collected	–	otherwise	they
would	never	take	risk-mitigating	actions	in	time	–	but	also	because	the	very	object	of	risk	management	is	protection
from	the	unexpected,	which	is	by	definition	the	hardest	event	to	prove	it	is	about	to	happen.	And	in	certain
instances,	Type	II	errors	can	have	catastrophic	consequences.
In	The	Plague,	there	is	a	meeting	of	the	town’s	prefect	with	several	doctors.	One	of	them,	the	protagonist	Dr	Rieux,
makes	the	point	that	it	is	essential	to	take	urgent	and	drastic	action	in	order	to	stop	the	epidemic	killing	half	the
population	of	the	city.	His	colleague	objects	that	it	has	not	been	proven	that	the	illness	is	in	fact	the	plague.	On
scientific	grounds	he	is	of	course	right,	but	Rieux	counters	that	proving	his	theory,	or	any	other	for	that	matter,	is	not
the	point:	“Let	us	just	say	that	we	should	not	act	as	if	half	of	the	city	was	not	at	risk	of	being	killed,	because	in	that
case	it	would	be.”
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Rieux	understands	that,	faced	with	a	potential	catastrophe,	his	priority	is	to	prevent	the	worst-case	scenario	from
happening,	and	this	course	of	action	cannot	wait	for	scientific	proof	of	what	the	disease	actually	is.	Decisions	when
dealing	with	extreme	risks	cannot	be	driven	by	full	scientific	evidence	because	such	evidence	is	almost	never
entirely	available.	Yet	acting	on	incomplete	information	remains	a	source	of	angst,	not	just	because	of	the
possibility	of	failure,	but	of	how	not	having	ensured	full	“scientific”	foundations	for	our	actions	can	be	later	construed
against	the	decision	maker.	In	areas	of	human	endeavour	where	lab	experimentation	is	not	an	option,	the	only
excuse	for	failure	seems	to	be	having	followed	accepted	procedure,	be	it	scientific,	bureaucratic,	legal	or	otherwise.
Being	wrong	having	followed	orders	seems	preferable	to	risk	being	right	having	used	one’s	own	imagination.
Twenty	years	ago,	German	psychologist	Dietrich	Dörner	wrote	The	Logic	of	Failure,	where	he	discussed	what
might	seem	a	simple	question:	why	do	things	go	wrong?	He	concluded	that	we	are	especially	bad	at	dealing	with
complex	systems—“we	are	prehistoric	minds	in	an	industrial	era”—and	that	as	a	consequence	we	are	mired	in	a
number	of	habits	that	undermine	our	decision	making.	Dörner’s	conclusions	are	even	more	true	for	the	digital	era.
Here	are	some	of	them:
•	We	tend	to	oversimplify	our	mental	models	of	complex	systems,	focusing	only	on	one	or	two	“key”	variables	and
underestimating	the	importance	of	other	factors.
•	We	are	especially	poor	in	analysing	and	forecasting	based	on	sequences	of	data	in	time.	We	tend	to	assume
linear	extrapolation	of	trends	and	do	not	cope	well	with	accelerating	or	decelerating	change	–	let	alone	with	the
possibility	of	a	change	in	trend	direction.
•	We	tend	to	see	new	situations	as	simply	extensions	of	old,	established	situations,	and	therefore	apply	old,
established	actions	which	may	not	be	appropriate.	This	may	be	self-protective	behaviour	to	allow	us	to	feel	that	we
can	cope.
•	We	tend	to	ignore	the	possibility	that	actions	we	take	now	may	have	unintended	consequences	and	cause
problems	that	currently	do	not	exist.
The	same	issues	that	Dörner	emphasised	have	played	out	as	countries	respond	to	the	pandemic.		In	India,	the
government	announced	a	lockdown	across	the	country	with	almost	no	notice.	It	did	not	consider	the	daily	wage	and
migrant	labourers	living	in	cities.	Consequently,	hundreds	of	thousands	of	these	workers	were	left	without	shelter,
food,	and	resources.	The	workers	began	the	long	journey	home,	trudging	hundreds	of	kilometres	on	foot	in
harrowing	circumstances,	perpetrating	a	humanitarian	crisis.
Thousands	thronged	railways,	bus	stations	and	highways,	terrified	of	the	choice	between	the		prospect	of	death	by
starvation	against	the	probability	of	infection.	Better	planning,	dispersed	decision-making	and	a	feedback-seeking
system	allowing	for	experience,	intuition	and	tacit	knowledge	would	have	probably	obtained	better	outcomes	than
top-down,	non-participative,	ad	hoc	measures.
Even	rich	countries	(apart	from	a	few	outliers	such	as	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands)	typically	seem	to	follow	the
trajectory	of	Dörner’s	observations.	There	is	discomfort	with	data,	and	a	desire	to	retrofit	it	to	conform	to	the
generated	“truths”	with	which	policy-makers	seem	to	be	comfortable.	Other	effects	and	costs	of	policy	measures	are
neglected:	these	could	range	from	hunger,	psychological	distress	and	“deaths	of	despair”	to	public	health,	social
solidarity,	increased	government	surveillance	and	stability	on	the	other,	with	cost	considerations	that	straddle	not
just	the	economic	but	also	the	social,	political	and	ethical	spheres.
The	decision-making	we	are	witnessing	today	under	conditions	of	uncertainty	privileges	the	playbook	over
imagination,	and	negative	general	goals	over	feedback-based,	specific	and	interim	goals.	Policymakers	have	an
incentive	to	favour	actions	that	can	be	subject	to	later	audit,	rather	than	on	the	probability	of	outcomes.	Given	that
the	dynamics	of	systems	are	too	complex	to	anticipate,	stress-testing	of	various	scenarios	could	be	useful	to
mitigate	the	impact	of	the	pandemic.	A	greater	inclination	to	risk-based	policy	responses,	factoring	in	collateral
damage,	may	lead	to	more	optimal	and	humane	outcomes	than	rigid	models.	In	the	ecology	of	uncertainty,	how
authorities	add	nuance	to	their	responses	–	whether	they	focus	on	containing	the	single	problem,	or	consider	the
costs	and	benefits	of	interventions	–	will	be	debated	for	a	long	time	to	come.
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